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Abstract
There is a longstanding academic debate regarding the role of financial networks. There
is a tradeoff between improving the flow of funds and acting as a channel for contagion.
This paper investigates the impact of banking networks on the real economy during the
Great Depression. Building permit values are used as a proxy for real economic activity as
implemented in previous research. A simple linear regression model estimated by ordinary
least squares is used such that locational networks are differentiated from networks links
to money centers and non-money centers. The results demonstrate that financial networks
have both positive and negative effects on real economic activity and building permits.
Positive network effects are observed when linkages to money centers are supported by
strong locational networks.
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I. Introduction
The Great Depression was a catastrophic period in history for the U.S. economy
and is the subject of intense academic debates regarding its causes, symptoms, and effects
on American life and the economy. Some scholars argue that liquidity crises forced
otherwise solvent banking institutions into bankruptcy, while others advocate that
insolvency was the primary cause of the multitude of banking panics that contributed to
the economic conditions of 1929-1939 (Mitchener & Richardson (2013); Allen & Gale
(2000)). A seldom-investigated topic related to the Great Depression is how the structure
of the banking system affected the recovery of cities after banking crises. Much research
has been conducted on the role of the banking system in the 1929 banking crises and the
Great Depression (see for example, Carson and Wheelock (2015), Richardson & Troost
(2009), and Bernanke (1983), among others), but there has been little focus on how the
structure of the banking system before the depression affected real economic growth at the
city level in the recovery period. In that vein, this paper intends to quantify and analyze the
effect that the correspondent banking network in 1929 had on the real economy. The
correspondent banking network was the primary source for reserve capital for 90% of all
state-chartered commercial banks in 1929, which at the time were not Federal Reserve
members (Mitchener & Richardson, 2016). The importance of the correspondent network
in the determination of credit flows allows it to serve as an acceptable model of the structure
of the banking system (Mitchener & Richardson, 2016). This structure has historically been
difficult to measure given the lack of digitized data on the complete U.S. banking system.
This paper overcomes the limitation by using a newly digitized directory of the entire U.S.
banking system.
6

Metrics that provide an acceptable proxy for real economic activity on the city level
have also been few and far between in previous research. This paper circumvents that
obstacle by using building permit values during the time period, a method implemented by
Leamer (2007) and Cortes & Weidenmier (2017), as a proxy for real economic activity.
Building permit values, referred to interchangeably as building expenditures, are an
acceptable metric by which to measure economic development at the level of an individual
town or city. Using this method, it is possible to develop a new framework for evaluating
the efficiency and efficacy of banking networks as they pertain to municipal growth. In a
series of remarks at a 2004 conference, then-President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, Timothy Geithner, stressed the importance that systemic risk would play in the
financial system and how the linkages between the banking system and non-bank financial
intermediaries would have significant effects on the financial system and the economy.
While the composition of the banking system has shifted significantly since the Great
Depression, it is still of critical importance to understand how the linkages that form the
financial system will impact the real economy. This paper is an attempt at a historical
examination of the topic, and investigates the tradeoff between spreading contagion and
improving the flow of funds that comprises the double-edged sword effect of the
correspondent banking network.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides
historical context on the topic. The third section is a review of existing literature in the
field. The fourth section describes the data used in this paper. The fifth section presents a
description of the empirical strategy used in the analysis. The sixth section present the
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results of the statistical analysis. The final section concludes and offers suggestions for
areas of future research, as well as policy implications.
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II. Historical Background
The expansion of the United States during the 1800s laid the foundation for the
formation of a correspondent banking network in order for interior banks to gain access to
the loanable funds necessary to continue expanding (Mitchener and Richardson, 2013).
Correspondent banking is the practice by which banks establish relationships with other
banks in regions outside of their areas of operation in order to facilitate capital flows
between them (Naughton & Chan, 1998). In the context of this paper and in this period in
United States history, the correspondent network was primarily necessary in order for
banks outside of the Federal Reserve system to have a secondary depository for their
reserves, and was an important lever that banks could pull when liquidity was tight and
they needed access to capital (Naughton & Chan, 1998). The structure became known as
the “pyramid structure,” due to the way capital flowed from small country banks (the base
of the pyramid) to money center banks in New York and Chicago (the tip) (Mitchener and
Richardson, 2013). The pyramid structure, wherein small-town banks had access to capital
in money center banks, became a permanent fixture of the financial institutions landscape
with the passage of the national banking acts of the 1860s (Mitchener and Richardson,
2013).
In 1927, 14 years after the establishment of the Federal Reserve, Congress passed
the McFadden Act, which restricted the ability of national banks to open branches in towns
outside of their home state, as well as in towns with populations of less than 100,000 people
(McFadden Act of 1927). This legislation further cemented the necessity of a strong
correspondent network, and underscored the risks inherent in linking the country’s banking
system together in such a way. The reason behind this is that the act allowed banks to hold
9

a portion of their reserve capital in money center banks, which led to the accumulation of
roughly two-thirds of all reserve capital in New York banks by the early 1900s (Mitchener
and Richardson, 2013). The restrictions on branch banking meant that the vast majority of
small towns in America relied entirely on state banks for commerce (Carson & Wheelock,
2015). It was because of this reliance on the correspondent network, along with the
reluctance of banks to utilize their reserve capital in times of financial hardship, that the
Federal Reserve was founded. In fact, Bordo and Wheelock (2011) find that all of the major
panics during the National Banking era were caused by the widespread withdrawals of
funds by the country and reserve banks from money center banks. The country needed a
lender of last resort to provide liquidity to illiquid banks in order to prevent their failure.
Though the Federal Reserve was successful in its stated role in mitigating bank runs, only
10% of state-chartered banks had joined the Fed system by 1929, leaving 90% of the
country’s state-chartered commercial banks to rely on the correspondent network in times
of liquidity squeezes (Mitchener & Richardson, 2016). While this may seem like a
troublingly high proportion, it must be noted that one hundred percent of national banks
were Federal Reserve members.
This paper investigates the role that the correspondent network served in the
development of local economies, whether positive or negative. Were these connections a
positive aspect of the banking system as they facilitated the flow of funds between
previously unconnected or isolated banking regions, or did they served as channels of
contagion during times of economic hardship? It is the intent of this paper to quantify the
effect that the correspondent network had on city development.
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III. Literature Review
When examining the existing research on the correspondent banking network and
real economic activity, it is possible to separate the analyses into two classes: the structure
of the banking system and the function of the banking system. While there is a lot of
interaction between the two classes, previous research has chosen to focus on either one
area or the other. I will discuss each in turn.
Investigation of the functions of the banking system during the Great Depression
era is headlined by Bernanke (1983), who investigates the role of the real cost of credit
intermediation in the disruption of the financial sector. He finds that the higher cost of
credit intermediation caused a higher effective cost of credit and a statistically significant
effect of price shocks on economic output. This is an excellent example of the effects of
the functions of the banking system on the real economy, as measured by price shocks on
economic output and credit costs. Bernanke’s paper is among the best at quantifying the
effects of the financial system on the real economy. While Bernanke did investigate the
effect of the banking system on the real economy, he used the cost of credit intermediation
(CCI) rather than the correspondent network, to do so.
Richardson and Troost (2009) use comparative analytics to quantify the effects of
different Federal Reserve bank policies across the St. Louis and Atlanta Federal Reserve
districts. They find that the active monetary policies enacted by the Atlanta Federal Reserve
had a positive effect on bank failure rates, proving that acting as a lender of last resort
helped to alleviate economic stress caused by decreasing the rate of bank failure.
Shifting now to the investigation of the structure and composition of the banking
system during the Great Depression era, Carson and Wheelock (2015) examine the efficacy
11

of the founding of the Federal Reserve on facilitating money flows. A significant finding
of their analysis is that the increased liquidity demand due to bank runs caused banks to
withdraw funds from their New York City correspondents simultaneously. This caused
banks to institute withdrawal and payment suspensions, releasing a domino effect across
the system. This relates to Richardson and Troost’s (2009) findings that the failure of a
majority of commercial banks to join the Federal Reserve system greatly impeded the
central bank’s ability to intervene in regional banking crises.
Mitchener and Richardson (2013) investigate the pyramid structure of the United
States banking system. The authors find that during the 1930s banking panics, interbank
deposit flows transmitted financial shocks from periphery banks to the core of the US
financial system. Ultimately, they suggest that the correspondent network was a channel of
contagion that spread risk throughout the entire banking system. This work is highly
relevant to this paper, as I am investigating the extent to which the correspondent network
affected the real economy.
Continuing with the theme of investigating the effect of the banking system
structure on the real economy, Mitchener and Richardson (2016) study network contagion
and interbank flows using empirical analysis of how interbank connections amplified
downturns. During panics, country non-member banks withdrew

from their

correspondents, which responded by accessing excess reserves deposited in reserve cities,
a contagion that worked its way up to Federal Reserve members at the top of the pyramid
in Chicago and New York. They find an aggregate reduction in lending associated with
correspondent deposit outflows of 15% during the Great Depression. Mitchener and
Richardson (2016) are effective at using the correspondent network to quantify the effect
12

of the banking system structure on lending volumes, but their analysis does not develop a
model that emphasizes the impact of the correspondent network on the real economy. This
paper will bridge the gap between the financial system and the real economy in a historical
context that has not been investigated before.
In a more recent investigation of the effects of the structure of the correspondent
network on the economy, Allen and Gale (2000) analyze the causes of financial contagion
based on the completeness of the structure of the banking system. The authors find that if
interbank markets are complete and each region is connected to all other regions, the initial
impact of a financial crisis in one region may be lessened, but the opposite is true in the
case of incomplete systems. While discussed in other terms in this paper, the completeness
of the banking system is a primary concern of this paper, insofar that completeness serves
as a boost to real economic development. While Allen & Gale (2000) study the effects of
structure of the banking system on the beginning of a crisis, this paper will contend with
the role of the correspondent network in driving municipal growth during a recovery
period. In this case, however, the authors’ research does not touch upon the impact on the
real economy.
It is evident that past research has focused heavily on the role of the banking sector
and the correspondent network in the propagation of financial crises, but to the best of my
knowledge, no past study has investigated the impact of the banking network on municipal
growth in that time period. As Leamer (2007) postulates, the building cycle is the most
important predictor of economic downturns, and it therefore makes sense to investigate
how the structure of the banking system impacts building expenditures as a measure of the
real economy. It has been well documented that the pyramid structure of the banking
13

system is responsible for spreading the contagion of bank failures through constant runs on
banks (see, for example, Mitchener & Richardson, (2013) and Bernanke (1983)), but there
does not appear to be any research that has examined the role that this system played in the
development of individual cities.
It is important to understand how the prevalent banking structure of the time
contributes to changes in construction in the American economy. To recognize how these
cities were resuscitated after the worst financial crisis in history is an important tool in
understanding the impact that banking networks have on city development. In order to
more fully comprehend the effect that financial linkages between institutions have on the
economy, one must first understand the origins of the current system. It is absolutely
critical that the impact of linkages between financial institutions is understood and its
impact on the real economy can be measured in order to direct policymaking geared
towards recovery from a crisis.
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IV. Data Review
The data used in this investigation comes from two sources. The first data source is
Dun and Bradstreet’s Review which includes raw building permit data for the year 1934.
The monthly economic review includes facts and figures on a wide range of topics
including economic conditions, industries, commodities, agriculture, and finance (Library
of Congress). Weidenmier & Cortes (2017) use building permits from the same source as
a forward-looking indicator of economic activity. The building permit data is used to
construct total building permit value, which is used as a proxy for real economic activity,
as outlined by Leamer (2007) and implemented by Weidenmier & Cortes (2017).
The second data source is a proprietary dataset compiled from Rand McNally Bankers’
Directory.1 It details micro-level data on the U.S. banking system that has not previously
been digitized. It includes, for each bank in the U.S. system, full balance sheet data (capital,
surplus, undivided profits and reserves, deposits, and other liabilities on the liabilities sides,
and cash, U.S. government securities, other securities, loans and discounts, and other
resources, on the assets side), along with town name, town population, map coordinates,
routing number, individual correspondent connections, Federal Reserve member status,
and state or national charter status. The data is reformatted to show city level aggregates
for correspondent connections and town assets and is then merged with the data from Dun
and Bradstreet’s Review. The sample of banking system data is restricted to cities included
in Dun and Bradstreet’s Review and further restricted to cities in the “East Central,” “South
Central,” “West Central,” and “Mountain” regions (as delineated by Dun and Bradstreet’s

1

As part of a study conducted by Dr. Angela Vossmeyer of Claremont McKenna College
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Review). The restrictions result in a sample size of 45 cities in 12 states that are mapped
below. A full list of cities included can be found in Table 4 in the appendix.

Figure 1: Highlighted Map of Selected States with Population Density, 1940. Source: U.S. Census Bureau

The outcome variable of this analysis is total amount of building permit value by
city for 1934. Monthly building permit values from Dun & Bradstreet’s review were
summed to create the total building permit value for the year. Cities totaled on average
$885,138 of building expenditures, while the compound aggregate growth rate over 1934
was, on average, 9.47%. This represents a positive level of city growth during one of the
worst economic crises in the history of the country. The raw data for the outcome variable
as well as selected independent variables can be found in Table 4 in the appendix and is
useful in order to gain some context on cities included in this study.
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Summary statistics for the outcome variable as well as all independent variables can be
found in Table 1 below, and provide an interesting overview of the structure of the U.S.
banking system and the state of municipal development during the time period.
Variable

Mean

Total Building
881,486.8
Permit Values
Growth Rate
0.095
(Jan.-Nov., 1934)
MCLINKS
26.33

Standard
Deviation
1047151

Minimum

Maximum

41315

5332824

0.111

-0.159

0.396

19.94

1

80

LINKS

55.26

36.58

2

157

POP

148,565

211,392.6

517

1,201,455

BANKS

15.13

10.8

1

47

ASSETS

1.12E08

1.9E08

510,910

1.20E09

MKTSHR

.351

.148

.15

1

Table 1: Summary Statistics

The variable MCLINKS is the total number of correspondents located in New York
City or Chicago, or “money center” banks, that each city was linked to. It was chosen as a
measurement of a city’s exposure to the “pyramid structure” of the Federal Reserve system,
and also as a measure of a city’s access to capital in those money centers. Each city had
an average of 26 linkages to U.S. money centers, though some had as few as one while
others had as many as 80, indicating a broad difference in levels of access to money-center
capital between cities. The variable LINKS is the total number of correspondent linkages
each city had, including money-center banks and non-money center banks. Total
correspondent linkages was chosen as a way to measure a city’s total access to geographic
liquidity as well as the magnitude of counterclaims that could be made against the bank.
Often times, a large proportion of a city’s non-money center linkages were to banks in the
17

same state as the city. The average city had roughly 54 total linkages around the world.
Again, though, there is a broad disparity between the most connected city with 157
correspondents, and the least connected with only two. The variable POP is the population
of each city in the sample in 1929. In some cases, city population data was not available,
so county population was used as a rough estimate. The average city in the dataset had a
population of 148,565, though that result was skewed by the presence of a few large cities
with populations greater than one million. The variable BANKS is a discrete measurement
of the total number of banking institutions operating within each city in the sample. It
captures the strength of the locational network of an individual city as measured by the size
of a city’s local banking system. The average number of banks in these cities was almost
15, though clearly skewed by the town with one bank (in Boise, ID), and Kansas City,
Missouri, with 47 banks.
The variable ASSETS is the sum of loans and discounts, bond securities, miscellaneous
assets, and cash exchanges on each city bank’s balance sheet. Average assets in these cities
were $113,000,000. Finally, the variable MKTSHR is the calculation of each city’s largest
bank’s total assets divided by the amount of total assets in the city. Interestingly, the largest
bank in each city had an average of 35% market share by assets. This means that the largest
bank in the average town controlled 35% of aggregate city assets, compared to 65% for all
of the other banks in the city. This could be due to the quality of banking services provided
by the largest town bank, in that the institution was more skillfully managed at allocated
loanable capital than other banks in the town. One important caveat for this variable is that
the banking data are for the year 1929, while the building permit expenditure data is from
the year 1934. While this mismatch may be a potential source of complication, it allows
18

for the investigation of how the correspondent network before the banking crises of the
1930s affected the recovery of cities after the crises had ended.
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V. Empirical Strategy
In order to examine the effect of the correspondent network on municipal growth, I
estimate a linear regression model as follows.
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖′ 𝛽 + 𝜀 for cities 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛

(1)

where 𝑦𝑖 is the total building permit expenditures in city 𝑖 for the year 1934. The vector 𝑥𝑖
includes variables for the interbank network, location network, market concentration, and
city characteristics for each city. Specifically, the control variables are: city population
(POP), total amount of bank assets in the city (ASSETS), number of banks in the city
(BANKS), market share of the largest bank in the city (MKTSHR), total number of
correspondent linkages to money centers (MCLINKS), total number of correspondent
linkages (LINKS), and an interaction between total linkages and number of banks in the
town (LINKBANK).
The particular covariates of interest are the total linkages, money center linkages, and
number of banks in the town, because these variables capture both the interbank network
and locational network. The interbank network is the previously described correspondent
network, while the locational network can be defined as the structure of each individual
town’s banking system with regard to the number of banks in the town. The interplay
between interbank and locational networks is one of the main features of this analysis, and
the importance of both with regards to economic performance cannot be understated. Of
interest is also the interaction variable which captures how locational networks modify
interbank network effects on real economic activity. The hypothesis is such that banks
located in small towns with few banks may experience higher contagion risk given their
lack of local networks, whereas in larger cities with a larger locational network will
20

experience a boost to real economic output due to the locational support for the interstate
banking network.
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VI. Results
The model in Equation (1) is estimated by OLS. White’s test for heteroscedasticity is
performed and the results fail to reject the null hypothesis of constant variance, indicating
that the typical OLS standard errors are appropriate. While the raw data is useful for
understanding general characteristics of the banking system, many variables take large
numbers. Since OLS is sensitive to outliers, log-transformations are implemented for a
number of variables. The results of Equation (1) are explained below and can be found in
Table 2 below.
Coefficient

Std. Error

R2

MCLINKS

.902**

.4318567

0.7358

LINKS

-.973**

.4207504

BANKS

-1.952***

.6341808

POP

-.066

.1149503

ASSETS

.492***

.1497491

MKTSHR

.326

1.046476

LINKBANK

.404***

.1160988

CONSTANT

6.83

2.078068

Table 2: Results of the Primary Regression

A town’s population (POP) does not have a statistically significant effect on total
building permit expenditures, indicating that a town’s population size has no effect on its
real economy. Instead, it is the financial size of a town that impacts its real economy, as
shown by the statistically significant effect of total assets (ASSETS) on building permit
expenditures. All else equal, a one percent increase in the log of total assets is expected to
22

produce a 0.492% increase in building permit expenditures. This is evidence that it is the
size of a town’s banking system, rather than its population, that affects its municipal
development. From a logical perspective, this makes sense. A town with a large population
but a relatively small banking system will have fewer loanable funds than one with a small
population but a large banking system. In reality, however, the above scenarios are rare.
While the effect of a town’s financial size (measured in total assets) clearly does
impact its municipal growth (measured in total building permit expenditures), it turns out
that the composition of the market share of its system does not. MKTSHR does not have a
statistically significant impact on building permit expenditures. This result indicates that
the effect of market share is not statistically different from zero. This is counterintuitive to
what was expected of this variable. It could be expected that, under the principles of good
bank management, banks with larger market share are more efficient at allocating capital.
Because the bank’s management is good at their jobs, their bank steadily increases market
share as the bank is continuously successful. In the case of this regression, however, this is
not true.
The effect of MCLINKS on building expenditures is statistically significant at
conventional levels. This indicates a positive effect of money center linkages on building
expenditures. This could be an indication that linking to money center banks increases the
amount of loanable capital, and increases the chances that the capital will be allocated to
building expenditures. Meanwhile, total correspondent linkages (LINKS) has a statistically
significant negative impact on city growth. This points to the inefficient allocation of
capital and bank mismanagement by non-money center banks, as well as the fact that nonmoney center banks can serve as a channel of contagion. This contagion effect during times
23

of crisis has been proposed by Mitchener & Richardson, 2013; 2016, and Allen & Gale
(2000), and now the effect has been corroborated in times of recovery as well. The effect
of contagion will be more thoroughly investigated with the interaction variable.
There have been a number of studies into the effect of portfolio mismanagement in
the role of bank failures. Esbitt (1986) finds that poorly-managed banks that failed in 1931,
lending some credibility to the theory that poorly managed correspondent banks were
partially responsible for the negative effect of increasing total correspondent linkages on
total building permit expenditures. If a bank held claims against a failed institution, its
deposits would be lost, and therefore unavailable for lending. This is a fairly robust
explanation of why non-money center banks have a negative effect on building permit
expenditures.
The interaction variable captures how locational networks modify correspondent
network effects on real economic activity. In essence, the variable measures how the effect
of correspondent networks on real economic activity is modified by the size of the banking
system in each town (as measured by BANKS). It could be expected that towns with few
banks may experience higher contagion risk given their lack of local networks, whereas
larger cities with a larger locational network will experience a boost to real economic
output due to the locational support for the interstate correspondent network. In order to
separate the effects of total linkages and money center linkages, the derivative of building
permit expenditures with respect to total linkages is taken, which results in
Δy
Δ𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠

= −0.973 + log(𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑆) ∗ (. 404).

(2)

This can be interpreted as the effect that an additional one percent increase in non-money
center linkages has on building permit values. -0.973 is the coefficient of LINKS and
24

represents the intercept for a town with one bank. 0.404 is the coefficient of the interaction
term.
The effect of money center linkages on total building permit expenditures is:
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 = −0.07 + log(𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑆) ∗ 0.404

(3)

where -0.07 is the sum of the coefficients on MCLINKS and LINKS (as an additional
money center link also increases total linkages) and 0.404 is the coefficient of the
interaction. The magnitude of this effect for various town sizes can be found in Table 3
below.
Number of
Banks in the
Town
1 (min)

Money
Center Link
Effect
-0.07%

Non-money
Center Effect
-0.973%

15

0.405%

-0.498%

47 (max)

0.606%

-0.297%

Table 3: Decomposed Network Effects

For small towns, money center linkages have a negative effect on building permit
expenditures until a banking system size of three or more. After three banks the effect
becomes positive, meaning that an additional money center correspondent in a town’s
network has a positive effect on city growth as measured by total yearly building
expenditures. As there is only one city in the sample with fewer than three banks, this effect
can be disregarded, and the results interpreted as money-center links have a positive effect
on real economic activity and building permit values. There is the presence of an increasing
marginal effect of adding a money-center bank to a town’s correspondent network. For
Kansas City, MO, the city with the most number of banks in its locational network, each
25

additional increase of 1% in money center banks yields a 0.606% increase in total building
permit value. The source of this effect is explained in Calomiris and Mason (2003), which
indicates that banks with interbank deposits at reserve city banks had greater liquidity in
times of crisis, which enabled them to operate more normally than banks without deposits
at reserve cities. Because the time horizon investigated by this paper falls towards the end
of a crisis period and the beginning of the recovery, it would appear that larger cities with
more money center correspondents had a better liquidity position than smaller cities with
money center connections and were therefore better equipped to handle increased
withdrawal volume over time. This effect shows that cities of any size need locational
support as well as strong money-center connections in order to contain the contagion effect
that is propagated by non-money center banks.
In regard to the non-money center effect, Equation (2) derived above shows a
marginally decreasing negative effect of adding non-money center banks to a town’s
correspondent network. Table 3 shows that at all banking system sizes, the marginal effect
of adding a non-money center bank to the network is negative, meaning that a one percent
increase in non-money center banks decreases total building permit expenditures in a town.
For the smallest town with only one bank, a one percent increase in non-money center
banks is expected to decrease total building expenditures by 1.08%. For a mid-size town
with 15 banks, the addition of a non-money center bank is expected to decrease total
building expenditures by 0.53%. For the largest town, whose local network contains 47
banks, building permit values are expected to decrease by 0.336% for each non-money
center bank added.

26

Calomiris & Mason (2003) provide a partial explanation for this effect. They find that
failures of nearby banks increase the probability that a bank fails, showing the impact of
the locational network. At the same time, Mitchener & Richardson (2016) provide support
for the impact of the correspondent network. When a correspondent is added, there is
additional withdrawal pressure in times of crisis. This pressure is greater on smaller
banking systems, which typically have less liquidity than larger systems with more robust
balance sheets. The lack of a strong locational network causes greater stress on small
systems than it would on larger systems. Therefore, it makes sense that the marginal effect
diminishes as the town’s banking system gets larger. The withdrawal pressure from
downstream correspondents is less intense and less damaging to larger systems than it is to
small systems that have less ability to rely on their locational networks in times of need.
The above theory might also help explain why the effect of non-money center additions to
a network is negative. Downstream withdrawal pressures from non-money center
correspondents will be much greater than withdrawal pressures from money center
correspondents. This is a fundamental aspect of the pyramid structure of the Federal
Reserve system, wherein withdrawal pressure is greatest at the bottom of the period. As
such, when small towns need liquidity, they look directly upstream at slightly larger
correspondents to provide that liquidity. This means that as a town adds a non-money
center correspondent, they are increasing the riskiness of its own banking system via future
or expected withdrawal pressures.
These results support the conclusion that the correspondent banking network had both
positive and negative effects on the real economy. For cities with a large enough locational
network, additional money center correspondents provided a boost to municipal growth,
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while additional non-money center correspondents were shown to have a negative impact
on growth. Cities with a small locational network also received a boost in growth from
additional money center correspondents, although in a lesser magnitude than large cities.
The growth of small cities was also impeded by the additional of non-money center
correspondents, and to a greater degree than in large cities. This is evidence that both good
and bad network effects are observable in the period after the 1930s banking crises, and
provide insights that can be useful to policymakers in the modern era.
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VII. Conclusion
This paper addresses the impact of the correspondent network on the real economy.
For the first time in history, digitized, bank-level data in the Great Depression era are
available, which provides an invaluable resource for the analysis of the correspondent
network. This paper’s main goal was to provide some measurement of the effect of the
correspondent network on the real economy in order to satisfy questions regarding how the
primary structure of the banking system during the Great Depression era affected the real
economy after the Great Depression. Data sources used in the analysis include Rand
McNally’s Bankers’ Directory, which was used to collect banking system data including
bank correspondents, bank balance sheets, and population information for 1929, as well as
Dun & Bradstreet’s Review, from which monthly building expenditures were taken and
used to construct total building expenditures for 1934.
I use a linear regression model of several variables (including money center
linkages, total linkages, town population, number of banks in a town, total assets in a town,
market share of the largest bank in the town, and the interaction between total linkages and
number of banks) on total building permit expenditures per town in order to measure the
correspondent network effect on the real economy. When addressing the nature of the
impact of the correspondent network on the real economy, a few observations can be
extracted from the regression analysis. Towns with small locational networks that link to
money-center banks will see city growth benefit as a result, but the magnitude of the benefit
is far less than that realized by cities with large locational networks. Overall, establishing
new money-center correspondents can be viewed as a definite benefit to economic growth
in municipalities, though the same cannot be said for non-money center correspondents.
29

Cities with small locational networks experience a greater decline in marginal building
expenditures when a non-money center correspondent is added than cities with large
locational networks do, though both large and small cities experience negative effects. The
cause of this can be found in the strength and size of a town’s locational network. Total
town assets had a positive effect on total building expenditures, indicating that a town with
a large locational network that contains a large pool of assets will see higher building
permit values than a town with a small locational network and a small pool of assets. A
large locational network signifies that banks in the town have more local support in times
of crisis, while a small locational network is more vulnerable to the financial health of large
money center correspondents, a claim supported by Mitchener & Richardson (2016). The
modified effect of locational networks on the impact of interbank networks on the real
economy shows that a strong interstate correspondent network must be supported by a
strong locational network.
These results can be applied to modern thinking on network effects and contagion
and used to offer different types of assistance to towns with different circumstances. The
revival of local economies was a major focal point after the great recession, and this
analysis allows for the effect of the local banking system to be taken into account when
determining stimulus and recovery measures. Broadly, this analysis signals the need for
present-day analysis of the effect of the banking system on the real economy, which is a
question that could shape municipal development for generations to come. Similar methods
could be used to quantify the impact of the shadow banking system on the real economy,
as well as measure how the failure of a systemically important financial institution might
affect local economies. It can be used provide targeted support to individual banks and
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communities based on the unique characteristics of each situation. If it is possible to better
understand how the financial system impacts changes in the real economy, it is possible to
build a framework to guide how that system develops, in order to provide a better-managed
and more prosperous growth regime in the future.
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Appendix
City
Grand Rapids
Huntington
Fort Smith
Muskogee
Boise
Pueblo
Lima
Dubuque
Newark
Springfield
Racine
Zanesville
Hammond
Superior
Colorado Springs
Green Bay
Terre Haute
Canton
Oklahoma City
Cedar Rapids
Columbus
Dayton
Madison
Akron
Little Rock
Youngstown
Toledo
Gary
Lincoln
Fort Wayne
Tulsa
Sioux City
Evansville
South Bend
Davenport
Denver
Kansas City
Des Moines
Omaha
Wichita
Cleveland
Topeka
Cincinnati
Milwaukee
Indianapolis
Kansas City

State1934 Building Permit Expenditures Growth Rate
OH
$435,295.00
11%
IN
$220,200.00
14%
AR
$208,022.00
3%
OK
$41,315.00
-10%
ID
$320,443.00
20%
CO
$156,565.00
5%
OH
$116,094.00
36%
IA
$149,178.00
17%
OH
$61,935.00
8%
OH
$189,484.00
36%
WI
$155,325.00
0%
OH
$60,648.00
15%
IN
$235,925.00
-16%
WI
$300,401.00
40%
CO
$545,080.00
18%
WI
$355,649.00
10%
IN
$687,709.00
13%
OH
$368,164.00
15%
OK
$1,625,146.00
-1%
IA
$1,415,974.00
5%
OH
$819,750.00
12%
OH
$802,904.00
-1%
WI
$476,119.00
19%
OH
$931,753.00
6%
AR
$386,282.00
11%
OH
$430,526.00
16%
OH
$2,368,425.00
3%
IN
$181,996.00
-7%
NE
$469,546.00
0%
IN
$360,039.00
-4%
OK
$942,423.00
-8%
IA
$1,085,618.00
21%
IN
$818,082.00
4%
IN
$221,375.00
10%
IA
$321,589.00
14%
CO
$2,518,524.00
11%
KS
$260,128.00
-4%
IA
$1,119,549.00
19%
NE
$1,917,867.00
5%
KS
$642,256.00
9%
OH
$2,902,925.00
9%
KS
$299,715.00
11%
OH
$5,332,824.00
8%
WI
$2,707,892.00
17%
IN
$2,830,533.00
13%
MO
$1,751,200.00
5%

Table 4: Raw data, ordered by number of banks in the city
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MCLINKS
1
6
5
5
7
16
7
12
6
5
14
9
14
11
17
18
17
22
21
26
29
13
23
26
30
19
30
24
21
32
27
36
28
37
24
47
24
33
52
25
65
26
68
73
80
80

LINKS BANKS
2
1
11
3
18
4
16
4
32
4
46
5
21
5
19
6
20
6
13
6
24
7
28
7
21
7
25
8
44
8
30
9
30
9
53
11
62
12
44
12
61
12
31
12
39
13
66
13
89
14
46
14
65
15
37
15
44
16
58
16
54
17
70
17
53
17
48
18
60
19
105
19
76
20
66
26
86
26
79
26
138
26
71
27
124
27
132
45
128
45
157
47
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